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RECENT DECISIONS
the non-Indian to deal with the Indian at his peril. This would neither
benefit the Indian nor serve the government's purpose to make the Indians
responsible citizens of this society.
SIDNEY J. STRONG.
CRIMINAL LAW: EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY MAY PREVENT A FAIR TRIAL.-
Defendant, convicted of the first degree murder of his daughter, con-
tended he was denied a fair trial because of inflammatory news coverage
of the crime. Held: Although the news coverage exhibited inflammatory
qualities, it was possible to select an impartial jury because the circu-
lation of the newspaper was limited. Therefore, defendant was not denied
a fair trial. People v. Jacobson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555 (1965).
The publicity surrounding a crime raises questions concerning the
accused's right to a trial before an impartial jury. The Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused in federal
courts the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. The
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to
an impartial jury in state courts.' The guarantee of an impartial jury is
also embodied in the constitutions of thirty nine states and can be im-
plied from the guarantee of trial by jury in the other eleven states.2
Montana is one of the thirty nine states that constitutionally guarantees
an impartial jury.3 The California courts have held that a fair trial re-
quires an impartial jury.4
The news media publicize crimes, investigations, arrests, and trials.
They also publish confessions or the fact of confessions, past criminal
records, and other matter that may be inadmissible at trial. Such pub-
licity may prejudice prospective jurors, destroy the presumption of in-
nocence, subvert the court's control over the admissibility of evidence,
and emphasize certain portions of the evidence. However, the public has
a right to be informed about the aevitity of its servants and institutions.
Publicizing criminal cases may act as a deterrent to further crime, and
it may assist in the solution of crimes. 5 The conflict between these two
'Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 ,.S. 717 (1961). Whether
the impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that guaranteed by due
process are the same has never been decided by the Supreme Court. It is arguable
that the impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment espouses the more rigid
requirements owing to the federal supervisory control over lower federal courts. See,
Note, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960).
'COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 579 (1959).
'MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 27 provides "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." State v. Dry-
man, 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796.
'Ex parte Wallace 24 Cal. 2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (1944) ; Ex parte Winchester, 53 Cal. 2d
528, 348 P.2d 904, cert. denied 363 U.S. 852 (1960).
'For a general discussion of this area see, SULLIVAN, "TRIAL By NEWSPAPER,"
1966]
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positions presents this question: At what point does the publicity con-
cerning a crime encroach upon the accused's right to an impartial jury?
Many federal cases have considered appeals from state court con-
victioris involving the problem of pre-trial publicity and the defendant's
right to an impartial jury. The issue is usually raised by the defendant's
claim that he was denied an impartial jury by the state court's rejection
of a motion for change of venue, motion for continuance, or challenge to
a juror. The contention that adverse publicity denied the accused an
impartial jury is rejected in most cases. 6 These cases rest on a combina-
tion of several factors: the publicity did not tend to arouse ill will ;7 the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on motions for change of
venue, continuances, or challenges to jurors ;8 the defendant did not avail
himself of the legal means provided to avoid the effects of prejudicial
publicity;9 the effects of the publicity were dissipated prior to the
trial ;1o the defendant's objection to the publicity was not timely ;11 and
the defendant did not demonstrate the existence of actual prejudice.12
The last factor seems to incorporate most of the others, and it has
(1961); Hambraugh, Free Press versus Fair Trial: The Contribution of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, 26 U. Pirr. L. REv. 491 (1965); McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial
Publicity; A Need for Reform, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 79 (1965); Note, 36 MIss. L.R.
369 (1965).
'Annot., 10 L. Ed. 2d 1243, 1251.
7The following cases found the publicity not to be prejudicial: In Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541 (1962), newspapers reported a Senate Committee's investigation of a
union of which the accused was president; and that accused had invoked the Fifth
Amendment 270 times. The papers also reported the committee's statements that
accused was guilty of many crimes, and that $250,000 had been taken from union
funds for his personal benefit. The accused's indictment before both a special grandjury and a federal grand jury received much news coverage. In United States ex rel.
Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956), two days before petitioner's trial, the local
paper reported a judge's commendation to a jury which had just rendered a verdict
against petitioner's accomplice. In Torrance v. Salzinger 297 F.2d 902 (3rd Cir.
1962), cert. denied 369 U.S. 887 (1962), the governor made denunciatory statements
over television about a recent turnpike scandal, but there was no mention of peti-
tioner, who was being tried for conspiracy to defraud the turnpike commission.
In United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (D. Ill. 1944), cert.
denied 325 U.S. 865 (1945), stories of crimes in the area made no reference to peti-
tioner's pending case.
8Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) ; Speis v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
supra note 7; United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied. 372 U.S. 959 (1962); Torrance v. Salzinger, supra note 7; United States
ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, supra note 7; Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 956 (1954), rehearing denied 347 U.S. 979 (1954).
"°Stroble v. California, supra note 9 (6 weeks) ; United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith,
supra note 9 (3 months); Torrance v. Salzinger, supra note 7 (8 months).
UUnited States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, supra note 7 (3 years after trial); Stroble v.
California, supra note 9 (petitioner did not raise contention until after his convic-
tion).
"In Beck v. Washington, supra note 7, all jurors who admitted bias or possible bias
and all jurors challenged for cause were excused. In United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy, supra note 7, petitioner failed to show the necessary amount of prejudice.
A demonstration of circumstances indicating the opportunity for prejudice is not
enough. In Stroble v. California, supra note 9, petitioner failed to demonstrate that
the requisite amount of prejudice resulted from adverse publicity. There was no
showing that the jurors had ever read the newspaper accounts of his crime.
Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943); Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F.2d 393 (8th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied 374 U.S. 817 (1963); United States v. Schaffer, 291 F.2d
689 (7th Cir. 1961) cert. denied 368 U.S. 915 (1961); rehearing denied 368 U.S. 962
[Vol. 27,
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received the most extensive discussion in the federal courts. Before a
reversal will be granted, the courts require that the defendant show such
clear and convincing evidence of prejudice as to necessarily prevent a
fair trial. 13 This standard forces the defendant to prove that at least one
juror was prejudiced when the verdict was rendered.1 4 Even though .
juror acknowledged that he had read accounts of a crime and formed an
opinion, nevertheless, he was held competent if he stated that he could
render a fair and impartial verdict.15  The courts reason that in a notori-
ous case it would be impossible to find jurors who had not read about
the case and formed some opinion.
Some federal authority has recognized the psychological improba-
bility of this approach and held that where the publicity is particularly
ubiquitous and intense, the court should disregard the jurors' assurances
of impartiality. 16 In Irvin v. Dowd17 six murders received extensive pub-
licity in local papers.' 8 The Supreme Court held that defendant was de-
nied the impartial jury guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Statements made by jurors during voir dire indicated an almost unanimous
opinion that the defendant was guilty.' 9 In light of these statements and
the extensive publicity, the Supreme Court ruled that the jurors' assur-
ances of impartiality should carry little weight.
In Rideau v. Louisiana20 a moving picture showing an interview in
(1961); Torrance v. Salzinger, supra note 7; United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith,
supra note 9.
"3Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 1, at 725; Stroble v. California, supra note 9, at 193.
Basically, the same test has been stated in other cases but in different terms. In
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51, 52-53 (1951), the court held that prejudicial
influences outside the courtroom must be brought to bear on the jury with such
force that the conclusion is inescapable that defendant was prejudged. In United
States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, supra note 7, the court said the defendant must show
the essential unfairness necessary for a violation of due process. In Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, supra note 1, it was held that pre-trial publicity must be such as to render
a trial a hollow formality.
"To show that a juror is prejudiced, defendant must show that the juror was not
able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence produced at trial. In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955). In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), the court
said, "The theory of our system is that conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
information .... ))
"Reynolds v. United States, supra note 8; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Thiede
v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510 (1895); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Irvin v.
Dowd, supra note 1. Before a juror becomes incompetent his opinion must be more
than a mere impression or hypothetical. Reynolds v. United States, supra note 8.
"6E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 1; Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 1; Shepherd v.
Florida, supra note 13; United States ex. rel. Sheffield v. Waller, 126 F. Supp. (D.
La. 1954), cert. denied 350 U.S. 922 (1955); United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,
313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
"'Supra note 1.
"News releases stated that defendant had confessed to all the murders and had offered
to plead guilty in exchange for a ninety year sentence. Defendant's juvenile record,
dishonorable discharge and confession to twenty four burglaries were also printed.
The paper continually referred to defendant as "the confessed slayer of six."
"Of the panel of 430 jurors, 260 were excused for harboring fixed opinions, 90%
of the entire panel entertained opinions of guilt, and eight of the twelve jurors
finally selected thought the defendant guilty.
"Supra note 1.
1966]
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which defendant admitted robbery, kidnapping, and murder was tele-
cast on three occasions. The Supreme Court held that defendant was not
accorded due process of law when the trial court denied a motion for
change of venue. Contrary to Irvin v. Dowd, the court stated that it need
not examine the voir dire to decide that due process had been violated.
Thus, Rideau v. Louisiana represents the first pre-trial publicity case in
which a state court conviction was reversed without a demonstration of
actual prejudice. 21
The federal cases do not present a concise test for determining
whether pre-trial publicity denied the accused his constitutional rights.
The problem is one of evaluating a number of factors in the light of the
circumstances of each case. Before the federal courts will presume
prejudice and reverse a state court conviction because of adverse pub-
licity each of these components seem to be necessary:
(1) A particularly reprehensible or spectacular crime.
(2) Timely publicity which is in its nature and content ve-
hement and extensive.
(3) The publicity either directly or by innuendo lays blame for
the crime upon the accused.
If one of these components is absent, the defendant may still secure a
reversal by showing actual prejudice. In the federal cases affirming state
court convictions, one or more of these components were missing and
the defendant failed to show actual prejudice. 22
The holding in the instant case conforms with decisions in the fed-
eral cases. The application of the federal rule would not require a
reversal because there was no extensive publicity. The newspaper ac-
counts were of limited circulation; and no members of the jury could
remember reading about the crime. The trial court properly held that
there was no showing of actual prejudice.
There are only two pre-trial publicity cases in which the Montana
Supreme Court overruled the trial courts denial of the defendant's mo-
tion for a change of venue. 23 In State v. Spotted Hawk an Indian was
accused of murder. 24 The court held that a fair trial was impossible
since the local papers inflamed the inhabitants' passions by heatedly dis-
cussing the disappearance of the victim and attributing it to Indians.
In State v. Dryman a newspaper circulated an "extra" which contained
the details of the crime, a picture of the defendant, captioned "killer,"
together with his confession, juvenile record, and a statement of his dis-
honorable discharge from the service.25 The Supreme Court, overruling
a denial of a motion for change of venue, reasoned that the article went
"The most recent case, Estes v. Texas, supra note 1, held there was a denial of due
process without a showing of actual prejudice. The decision was based on the
televising of defendant's trial.
"See cases cited supra note 10 in which the publicity was not timely. For cases in
which there was no demonstration of prejudice see supra note 12.
'State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 1026 (1899); State v. Dryman, supra
note 3.
24Supra note 23.
2Supra note 3.
[Vol. 27,
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beyond the mere printing and dissemination of news. It tended to create
strong feelings against the defendant. These two cases exhibited all of
the factors required for a federal reversal of a state court conviction. 26
The majority of Montana cases have rejected the contention that
adverse publicity denied the defendant his right to an impartial jury.
The cases generally refuse to reverse a conviction because the requisite
prejudice has not resulted from the adverse publicity. The courts have
based this conclusion on a number of factors: prejudice did not result
from the mere printing of the story of a crime,27 even though it inti-
mated the defendant's guilt;28 the affidavits supporting a motion for
change of venue did not recite facts demonstrating the existence of
prejudice ;29 the allegedly prejudicial news articles were not submitted
with the record on appeal;30 a juror was competent to serve even though
he had read accounts of the. crime and formed an opinion thereon ;31 and
the impaneling of the jury did not require the examination of an inordi-
nate number of talesmen.
32
With one exception, at least one of the factors common to the fed-
'Both cases involved murders. Newspapers of general circulation condemned each
defendant, fastening the blame for the crimes on them. The courts in both cases
detailed circumstances indicating a prejudiced community. In the Spotted Hawk
case the inhabitants of the region had ordered arms and ammunition; a number of
families had moved from the Indian agency; and a group of inhabitants had
appeared at the agency demanding the guilty party. In Dryman the court referred
to the sheriff's request to move the defendant from the county pending appeal
because of the high feeling against him.
"State v. Bess, 60 Mont. 558, 199 Pac. 426 (1921); See, State v. Board, 135 Mont.
139, 337 P.2d 924 (1959); State ex rel. Hanrahan v. District Court, 145 Mont. 501,
401 P.2d 770 (1965).
'State v. Bess, supra note 27.
21See, REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-1906. Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50
(1877) ; State ex rel. Hanrahan v. District Court, supra note 27. State v. Barick, 143
Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170 (1964): It is not sufficient for the affiant to allege that
defendant could not have a fair and impartial trial because people of the place of
trial had fixed opinions as to his guilt. State v. Davis, 60 Mont. 426, 199 Pac.
421 (1921): The court held it was a mere conclusion that defendant would be
denied a fair trial because the story of the crime was printed and generally read by
the inhabitants. Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mont. 257, 5 Pac. 847 (1885): Affiant stated
stated that defendant was prejudiced because a prior civil verdict had been returned
against him and had received extensive coverage in local papers. Territory v. Manton,
8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888): Affiant stated only that he had heard defendant's
case discussed in a manner prejudicial to him. Cf. State v. Spotted Hawk, supra note
23; State v. Dryman, supra note 3.
'State v. London, 131 Mont. 410, 310 P.2d 571 (1957); State v. Barick, supra note 29;
State v. Davis, supra note 29.
31State v. Sheerin, 12 Mont. 539, 31 Pac. 543 (1892); State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518,
77 Pae. 50 (1904); State v. Juhrey, 61 Mont. 413, 202 Pac. 762 (1921).
'
2State v. Bess, supra note 27 (40 jurors called, 10 peremptory challenges used and
only 14 excused for having an opinion on the case); State v. London, supra note 30
(the court stated the number of jurors examined was an important determinate of
whether or not there had been an abuse of discretion); State v. Board, supra note 27
(one of the factors to be considered) ; Territory v. Corbett, supra note 29 (a jury
was obtained after the examination of only 56 talesmen); State v. Hoffman, 94
Mont. 573, 23 P.2d 972 (1933) (34 talesmen were examined). But see, State v.
Spotted Hawk, supra note 23; Kennon v. Gilmer, supra note 29, at 264: "This is
not the test to be applied to the question, for such a jury might be found when the
public sentiment was in a blaze of excitement and passion against one of the parties
to the action; and the presence of this public sentiment might make itself felt
during the trial in very many ways, upon the jury, upon the witnesses, and officers
of the court, and upon the court itself."
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eral cases reversing state court convictions is absent from the majority
of Montana cases. Two cases involved minor burglaries which are neither
particularly reprehensible nor spectacular crimes.33 And in many cases
the defendant failed to show such prejudice existed in the community
that an impartial jury could not be secured.34 Thus, regardless of thc
scope or the content of the publicity, the Montana cases require a show-
ing of actual prejudice. To the extent that these cases will act as a
precedent in future determinations, they do not conform with the rule
posited by the Rideau case. The Rideau case reached the conclusion that
when the publicity is extensive and permeated with prejudicial matter,
there is inherent prejudice and no need to prove actual prejudice. In
Montana only State v. Hoffman exhibited the extensive prejudicial pub-
licity necessary to come within the Rideau rule.35 Because the Montana
court in the Hoffman case required a showing of actual prejudice, it is
inconsistent with the Rideau rule. However, the Hoffman case was decided
thirty years before Rideau, and at a time the federal courts required a
showing of actual prejudice. The recent case of State ex rel. Hanrahan,
however, reached a result consistent with the Rideau rule because the
publicity was neither as extensive nor of such interest as the publicity
implicitly required by Rideau.3 6 Therefore, the court's requirement that
actual prejudice be shown was justified.
Neither the federal rule nor the Montana rule delineate guidelines
for determining the necessary quantum of actual or inherent prejudice
that denies the defendant a fair trial. No guidelines are provided for
separating the heavily publicized case from one requiring a showing of
actual prejudice. Consequently, both the federal and Montana rule are
unduly vague.
A more definitive standard which avoids this defect of the federal
rule is utilized by the Supreme Court of the United States through its
powers of supervisory control over the federal courts.3 7 This standard
was crystallized in Marshall v. United States.3 8 The court held, as a matter
of law, that jurors were prejudiced if exposed through the news media
to evidence inadmissible at trial.3 9 This rule is not determinative in all
3State v. Board, supra note 27; State ex rel. Hanrahan v. District Court, supra note 27.
"See cases cited notes 29 and 32.
'Supra note 32. Defendant was charged with murder under brutal circumstances.
Although the case involved a reprehensible crime, a published confession, and exten-
sive and vehement publicity, the court refused to reverse the conviction.
*Supra note 27. In this case defendant had confessed to 1 $580 burglary. This fact
was printed, and the sheriff related it on a local news broadcast.5 The nature of supervisory control was stated in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 340 (1943): "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implied the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards
of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance
of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reasons which are summar-
ized as ' due process of law' ... "
-360 U.S., 310 (1959).39See also, Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952): A congressional
committee engendered extensive prejudicial publicity against defendant, most of it
going beyond the scope of the indictment in defendant's pending case. Janko v.
United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam 366 U.S. 716 (1961) ;
[Vol. 27,
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cases because the defendant might be denied a fair trial even though
the news media disseminates nothing that would be inadmissible at trial.
Unfortunately, it is necessary to wait until the trial has begun before the
test can be applied because the court must ascertain whether or not the
jurors have been exposed to inadmissible evidence. In that respect, it
might cause delay and added expense. The Marshall rule would give
effect to the fundamental premise that guilt or innocence should be de-
termined solely on the evidence produced in a court of law.40 A literal
application of this premise in connection with the Marshall rule would
seem to declare that a juror becomes incompetent if he has learned of
any evidence through pre-trial publicity. This, of course, would be an
unsatisfactory extension of the Marshall rule. In the sensational case it
would be impossible to find a juror who does not have some acquaintance
with the facts. Therefore, the Marshall rule should be limited to inad-
missible evidence and perhaps to the pre-trial publication of confessions. 41
Because of the defects inherent in the Montana and federal rules it
is submitted that the Montana court should adopt the rule of the Marshall
case. In addition, the federal courts should impose the rule of the
Marshall case upon the states as an essential element of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause. Two recent federal cases have applied
reasoning similar to that used in Marshall in their review of state con-
victions. 42 "Fundamental fairness" requires that a judge's verdict be
based solely on evidence that is admissible at trial.
LARRY PETERSEN.
WATER LAW: A STATE CANNOT "APPROPRIATE" A MINIMUM FLOW OF
WATER IN A NATURAL STREAM FOR PRESERVATION OF FISH.-A water con-
servation district, acting under a Colorado statute empowering it to "file
upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water of any natural
stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessary to
Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955); Marson v. United States,
203 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1953); Krogman v. United States, 225 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1955): an unfavorable, incorrect report of evidence against defendant which comes
to the attention of jurors, raises a rebuttal presumption that the rights of the
defendant have been prejudiced.
'Patterson v. Colorado, supra note 14.
"A confession has a natural tendency to prejudice any community. Yet the news
media proffers confessions without the tempering effects of cross-examinations,
contrary evidence, or instructions. Disqualifying a juror who learned of defendant's
confession before trial seems to be in accord with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964). The Supreme Court held that a jury determination of voluntariness of a
confession denied the defendant due process of law. One reason advanced by the
Court was that a confession, even if determined to be involuntary, would affect
the jury's consideration of 6ther evidence. A confession read by a juror before trial
would seem to fall within the proscription of this ruling.
"Shepherd v. Florida, supra note 13; Shepperd v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1965).
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